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Class Size and the Regression Discontinuity Design: 
The Case of Public Schools 
 
Using a rich individual-level dataset on secondary public schools in Israel, we find strong 
evidence for discontinuities in the relationship between enrollment and household 
characteristics at cutoff points induced by a maximum class size rule. Our findings extend 
existing work that documents such discontinuities only among private schools (Urquiola and 
Verhoogen, 2009). These discontinuities violate the assumptions underlying the regression 
discontinuity design, which are crucial for identification. Consequently, IV estimates of class 
size effects are likely to be seriously biased. Potential manipulation of the treatment 
assignment rule by public schools warrants caution in applying a regression discontinuity 
design to estimate class size effects and indicates that institutional context is crucial for its 
scope of applicability. 
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1.  Introduction 
The unresolved debate over the importance of class size as a determinant of student 
performance remains a key issue in the economics of education, and it feeds into the 
ongoing public debate about the value of class size reduction.
1 Studies dealing with 
this empirical question are particularly preoccupied with the problem of non-random 
placements of students between and within schools. To address this issue, they often 
adopt  a  quasi-experimental  approach  that  exploits  the  presence  of  instrumental 
variables  to  disentangle  the  causal  effect  of  class  size  from  the  effect  of  sorting. 
Angrist and Lavy, 1999, and Hoxby, 2000, are seminal papers which apply regression 
discontinuity  (RD)  design  to  estimate  the  causal  effect  of  class  size  on  student 
achievements, the former in Israeli elementary schools, and the latter in public schools 
in  Connecticut.
2  Numerous  studies  similarly  implemented  this  approach  in  related 
contexts more recently (Urquiola 2006, Woessmann 2005, among others).   
  These  studies  differ  significantly  in  regard  to  the  estimates  of  class  size 
effects, varying from no effects to significant and substantial ones.  This is true even 
with papers employing similar methodology; for example, Angrist and Lavy, 1999, 
and Urquiola, 2006, in their different contexts, point out robust positive effects of 
reduction  in  class  size  on  achievements,  while  Hoxby,  2000,  and  Urquiola  and 
Verhoogen, 2009, find none, all employing a very similar RD design.   
Indeed, it is now recognized that the RD is an application-dependent tool, whose 
ultimate success may depend on underlying institutional details, see Lee and Lemieux, 
2009.  In a closely related paper, Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) illustrate neatly this 
                                                 
1 Several important studies indicate no significant effect of class size on student outcomes (Hoxby 
2000, Hanushek 1986, Woessmann and West 2006) while others demonstrate that smaller class sizes 
enhance student outcomes (e.g., Angrist and Lavy 1999, Krueger 1999, 2003, Sander 2003).    
2  Hoxby, 2000, also uses an additional identification strategy that does not rely on discontinuities, to 
confirm the findings.   3
issue for the case of discontinuities in class size in private schools.  It turns out that 
Chilean private schools, seeking to maximize profits, manipulate enrollment to avoid 
adding  an  additional  classroom,  and  households  sort  themselves  across  schools  in 
response  to  this  situation.  Urquiola  and  Verhoogen’s,  2009,  empirical  evidence 
demonstrates that this behavior invalidates the RD design.
3 More specifically, their 
data  suggest  that  students  after  the  cutoffs  (smaller  class  sizes)  consistently  come 
from stronger backgrounds, which means that RD estimates overestimate the effect of 
class size on student outcomes.  However, they argue that the continuity assumptions 
underlying the design are not likely to be violated in public school systems, where 
students are required to attend local schools that cannot control enrollments.  Indeed, 
this argument is very much likely to be true in the context, for example, of public 
schools in New England, as shown convincingly in Hoxby, 2000.  It is also likely to 
hold true in the context of elementary public schools in Israel, studied in Angrist and 
Lavy, 1999 (see below); but, as will be made the case in this paper, this argument fails 
in secondary public schools, there and possibly elsewhere. 
To make our case, we first model a mechanism that provide incentives to public 
schools administrators who seek to maximize their student outcomes under a given 
per-student funding budget constraint, to create smaller classes for weaker students 
and thus to manipulate the treatment assignment rule in this direction. The mechanism 
is quite general and is likely to exist in many public school systems.  We also discuss 
institutional characteristics that make such manipulation possible and show that it is 
more likely to occur in the context of secondary schools than in elementary schools in 
Israel. Then, we use a rich individual-level dataset on students in Israeli high schools 
to examine whether the predictions of our model are borne out in the data.  
                                                 
3 More generally, the evolving literature on RD design has shown that when the treatment assignment 
rule is public knowledge, agents can potentially manipulate the rule, thereby invalidating the continuity 
assumptions required for identification (Lee 2008, McCrary 2008).   4
The incentive presented in our model to create smaller classes for weaker students 
while larger classes for stronger students is commonplace in many countries as is 
shown  in  West  and  Woessmann  (2006).    Examining  the  sorting  of  students  into 
classes of different sizes for 18 national education systems, this paper finds that in all 
countries, with the exception of the US, there exist strong compensatory patterns of 
sorting within and especially between schools.  We, therefore, argue that since school 
administrators have a strong incentive to allocate students in a compensatory manner, 
depending on a context, it may be naïve to assume that they react mechanically to the 
treatment assignment rule instead of manipulating it to achieve their goals.  
In Israel, secondary public schools face a maximum class size rule of 38 students, 
which induces a class size function of enrollment with discrete jumps at enrollments 
that are multiples of the class-size cap. These jumps can be used to identify the causal 
effect of class size on student outcomes only if the relationship between enrollment 
and  household  characteristics  is  continuous  at  these  jumps  (Hahn  et  al.,  2001). 
Implementing several tests we find strong evidence that discontinuities exist in the 
relationship between household characteristics and enrollment, which invalidates the 
continuity assumptions that are crucial for identification. Moreover, in stark contrast 
to Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) but consistent with our model and with West and 
Woessmann’s (2006) findings of compensatory patterns of student sorting in public 
school system across countries, we find that students after the cutoffs (smaller class 
sizes)  come  from  weaker  backgrounds.    This,  in  turn,  means  that  RD  estimates 
substantially  understate  the  effect  of  class  size  on  student  outcomes.    Using  the 
methodology of Altonji et al. (2005), we further show that the IV bias induced by 
these discontinuities is likely to be quite strong.  In contrast, implementing the same 
tests on the Angrist and Lavy’s dataset, we find no such discontinuities for elementary   5
schools, thus reinforcing support for their findings.  This leads us to conclude that the 
RD design can be very much context sensitive and its application success depends on 
institutional details.  Without paying close attention to these details, research based on 
the RD design can yield misleading results. 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.    The  next  section  describes  the  institutional 
structure  of  public  schooling  in  Israel  and  presents  simple  analytics  of  students’ 
allocation in public schools. It is followed, in Section 3, by the description of the data 
and design.  Section 4 contains our main empirical findings, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Institutional and theoretical background 
We first provide institutional background about public schooling in Israel and then we 
present a simple model that rationalizes students’ assignment in public schools. 
 
2.1 The structure of public schools in Israel 
Public  schools  in  Israel  are  financed  and  (tightly)  regulated  by  the  Ministry  of 
Education.  Curriculum is highly centralized, and teacher salaries – the main spending 
component - are determined through centralized bargaining.  Schooling is divided into 
levels, elementary (grades 1-6), middle school (graded 7-9), and high school (grades 
10-12).  The secondary public school system (the middle school and the high school 
levels)  has  three  tracks,  general  (academic),  technological  and  agricultural.  In  the 
general  academic  track,  students  complete  a  full  academic  program  that  leads  to 
matriculation.  Matriculation  exams  are  designed  and  delivered  by  the  Ministry  of 
Education in 10-12
th grades.  The technological track offers students both academic 
and vocational subjects. The range of technological subjects is wide and varies among   6
schools.  The  subjects  include  design,  computer  skills,  industrial  automation, 
electronics,  and  telecommunications.  Some  technological  studies  culminate  in  a 
matriculation exam and others in only a practical completion certificate. The public 
school system includes four school types, comprehensive schools (which include all 
three tracks), technological/vocational schools, general schools (academic track), and 
agricultural schools. Only a third of the students in the general track are enrolled in 
general schools.  In secondary schools, financing is by a voucher per student, whereas 
elementary schools also get a subsidy per class.  A maximal class size is dictated by 
the Ministry of Education and stands at 40 students (the, so called, “Maimonides’ 
rule”) in elementary schooling and at 38 students in secondary schooling. 
  School  choice  within  the  public  school  system  is  virtually  non-existent  in 
Israel,  students  being  educated  within  the  school  district  of  their  residence 
(municipality).   Typically, however, a school district has a number of schools within 
its jurisdiction, and assignment of students to a particular school within the district 
may  be  flexible,  especially  at  the  high  school  level.    Specifically,  while  at  the 
elementary school level responsibility for students’ assignment rests with the Ministry 
of Education, and students typically attend a school geographically closest to their 
residence, at the high school level this responsibility rests with the school district, and 
school capacity and teachers’ availability are among the considerations determining 
students’ assignment.
4   
 
2.2 Analytical background 
To inform our empirical analysis, it is helpful to understand the constraints and the 
objectives  facing  public  school  administrators.  In  this  section,  we  first  model  a 
                                                 
4 We are grateful to Mr. David Lifschitz, the Chief of the Education Division of the City Council of 
Beer Sheva, for very helpful information and an illuminating discussion on which this account is based.   7
mechanism that provides incentives to school administrators to manipulate the class 
size  rule,  using  essential  features  of  the  system,  such  as  per  student  subsidy  and 
limited mobility across school districts; then we discuss institutional characteristics 
that make such manipulation possible.  We should state from the outset that, while our 
model assumptions capture essential characteristics of public school systems, so that 
its predictions in regard to the incentives of school administrators are fairly generic, 
their implementation hinges upon a particular institutional setting. 
  Consider a problem faced by administrators of a school district.  Let N denote 
the district’s enrollment; s - subsidy per student; n – student per class; k = N/n is the 
number of classes (we will ignore issues of indivisibility); q – a student’s academic 
propensity or quality; F – a fixed cost per class (that consists of a teacher’s salary, a 
rent of a classroom etc.).  We let c(n, q) denote the cost of attaining a desired level of 
schooling in a class populated by n student with quality q, where cn, cnn > 0, cq < 0, cn 
(0, q) > 0.   
Note that the number of students in a district is treated as exogenously given.  
This reflects the relatively low household mobility in Israel and implies – given the 
budgeting formula – that the district’s revenues are constant.  It then follows that a 
plausible objective of a district’s school administrator is cost minimization required to 
attain a desired level of academic standard, in other words, 
 
Minn C(n) = (N/n)[F + c(n, q)] 
 
The  model  is  inspired  by  Lazear,  2001,  where  a  framework  for  analyzing 
optimal class sizes in the context of profit maximizing schools is constructed, but 
differs from it in several essential features.  The most important of these is the source   8
of revenue and the objective function of school authorities, which are here supposed 
to reflect the nature of public schools. 
The first order condition is: 
 
dC(n)/dn = -(N/n
2)[F + c(n, q)] + (N/n)cn(n, q) = 0 
 
and our assumptions guarantee that the second order condition, d
2C(n)/dn
2 > 0, holds. 
Totally differentiating the first order condition we obtain that ∂n/∂F = (N/n
2)/(SOC) > 
0, implying that the optimal class size increases in the fixed cost component.  Also, 
   
∂n/∂q = (cq/n - cnq)/(SOC) 
 
which is positive, indicating a positive effect of student quality on class size, if cnq < 
cq/n.  It, in particular, holds when cnq = 0, so that the cost effect of student quality is 
independent of class size.  Alternatively, suppose that c(n, q) = n
α q
β, α>1, β<0.  Then 
cnq = - αβ n
α−1 q
β−1 < cq/n = - β n
α−1 q
β−1, so that the condition holds again.   
  This latter result indicates that, optimally, under plausible assumptions low 
quality students will be found in smaller classes.  This result obviously hinges upon 
the assumed financing scheme under which a school is reimbursed on a per student 
basis.   
  Differentiating twice, we further obtain under our assumptions that ∂
2n/∂q∂F < 
0, implying that the relationship between student quality and class size is moderated 
through the fixed cost component.  Now, subsidization per class – as takes place in 
elementary schools, but not in secondary schools in Israel – decreases the fixed cost 
component F, as viewed by school administrators, thus resulting in a smaller effect of   9
student quality on class size.  This may explain why manipulation of class size is 
relatively more attractive in secondary than in elementary schools. 
Further, a school district operating a number of schools can affect class size 
through  the  number  of  students  it  assigns  to  various  schools  (as  the  enrollment 
number N applies to a school district as a whole).  For example, it would be likely to 
assign a number of students just under the cut-off point to a school located in an 
affluent neighborhood with stronger students, thereby creating larger classes for these 
stronger students, while assigning a number of students just over the cut-off point to a 
school  located  in  a  poorer  neighborhood  with  weaker  students,  to  create  smaller 
classes for weaker students.
5 This mechanism does not necessarily imply  stacking 
since local authorities may assign schools a number of students not exactly at one of 
the cutoff points but rather before them or after them. In addition, this mechanism is 
also consistent with our finding that manipulation of the treatment assignment rule 
applies  in  secondary  schooling  but  not  in  elementary  schooling,  as  in  secondary 
schooling the motivation of school district’s administration to report better measured 
results (matriculation rates) is higher.  Further, only in the context of high schools 
have  local  authorities  in  Israel  the  flexibility  to  shift  students,  based  on  physical 
capacity and teaching needs considerations. 
 
 
3  Data and design 
Our data contain administrative records collected by the Israel Ministry of Education 
for the year 2003 on all 12
th grade public school students in Israel living in localities 
                                                 
5  The motivation of schools and local authorities to assign weaker students to smaller classes in order 
to increase the matriculation success rate is reflected in some simple OLS regressions we performed of 
actual class size on mother's education, father's education and the disadvantaged index of the school 
(not presented in the paper but available from the authors upon request). The regressions indicate that 
weaker students are generally placed in smaller classes.    10
with a population higher than ten thousand residents (amounting to 64,429 students 
from 517 schools).
6 Each record provides data on whether the student is eligible for a 
matriculation  diploma,
7  along  with  detailed  family  background  including  gender, 
father's years of schooling, mother's years of schooling, number of siblings, ethnicity,  
a  dummy  variable  indicating  immigrant  status  and  dummies  for  the  mother's  and 
father's continent of birth. In addition, the record includes several variables on the 
class and school of each student such as number of students in the class, percent 
females in the class, disadvantaged index of the school in 2003, disadvantaged index 
of the school for the year 2008-2009 and enrollment level of the school.
8,9 Finally, 
information is also available on the socioeconomic status of the city in which the 
student resides. 
Our database includes information on the track of 64,337 students. It indicates that 
39,580 students study in the general track, 24,255 in the technological track and 502 
in the agricultural track. In our database, of the 39,580 students who study in the 
general track only 12,242 are in general schools. We focus our analysis on students 
from  general  schools  where  the  maximum  class  size  rule  is  relevant  but  ignore 
technological and comprehensive schools where it is not relevant as these schools 
                                                 
6 The statistical abstract in Israel (2004, Table 8.19) reports that the number of pupils in 12
th grade 
public schools in 2003 was 72, 771 (58,971 in non-religious state schools plus 13,800 in religious state 
schools).  The discrepancy between this figure and the number of observations in our dataset (64, 429 – 
89% of the entire number) is due to the fact that 8,342 pupils are omitted for reasons of confidentiality 
since they come from localities with population of less than 10,000.   
7  A  matriculation  diploma  is  a  necessary  condition  for  the  continuation  of  academic  studies  in  a 
university  or  college.  Many  employers  also  make  it  a  condition  for  employment.  The  diploma  is 
granted to students who pass a series of state-administered exams.  
8 Ideally, we would prefer to use class size as measured at the beginning of high school (9
th grade). 
However, since we do not have this information, we use class size measured in 12
th grade.  
9  The disadvantaged index was created by the Ministry of Education and is based on the students' 
family background. A high index reflects a low socioeconomic status. The disadvantaged index of 
schools in 2003 contained missing values for more than 50% of the pupils. Fortunately for us, based on 
registration records, a new disadvantaged index was recently calculated for the school year 2008-2009 
(beginning  in  September  2008),  which  includes  almost  all  schools  in  Israel.  Assuming  that  the 
socioeconomic status of the schools did not change substantially in this period, we can use the 2008-
2009 index to control for the socioeconomic status of students. Indeed, the correlation between the 
2003 and 2008-2009 indices is 0.77.   11
regularly open additional classes before their enrollment level reach the class-size cap 
in order to separate students from different tracks.  Obviously, there is no need to test 
whether the treatment assignment rule is manipulated in schools where the maximum 
class size rule is irrelevant. Our sample includes all 12
th grade pupils who are enrolled 
in general schools in localities with a population over 10,000, in sum 12,242 pupils 
from  167  schools.  Summary  statistics  are  reported  in  Table  1.
10  Comparing  the 
summary statistics of the students in our sample with those of the general 12
th grade 
population  we  find  that  the  former  have  somewhat  stronger  background 
characteristics. For example, while in our sample the father's years of schooling is 
13.7,  in  the  general  population  it  is  only  12.79.  Similarly,  the  mother's  years  of 
schooling in our sample is 13.68, compared to only 12.93 in the general population. 
The disadvantaged index of the school also indicates that the students in our sample 
have a higher socio-economic status. In our sample the disadvantage index is 3.97, 
while in the general population it is 5.55. General schools are generally smaller in size 
relative to other high schools as they include only one track. In our sample, the mean 
enrollment level of schools is 145 while in the general population it is 212. Although 
the students in our sample differ slightly from the general population, it is valid for 
                                                 
10  For  several  covariates  we  had  missing  values  (see  Table  1).  Thus,  in  regressions  where  these 
covariates appear on the right-hand side so as not to end up with a selective sample we completed the 
data  for  some  of  these  covariates,  in  which  cases  we  also  added  in  the  regressions  indicators  for 
missing values of these covariates. More specifically, in cases where the number of siblings was not 
reported,  we  assigned  the  pupil  the  average  number  of  siblings  in  the  class.  Similarly,  instead  of 
separately controlling for each of the parent's years of schooling we controlled for parents' average 
years of schooling and in cases where one of the parent's years of schooling was missing we assigned 
this variable the years of schooling of the other parent. In cases where the father's or mother's continent 
of birth was missing we just added a dummy indicator for missing values of these covariates. We 
obtained a sample of 11,754 pupils for which we have all the covariates, losing about 4% of sample due 
to missing data in several school-level covariates. As identification is at the school level, and because 
only a very few observations were missing in these covariates, we preferred not to complete them. Note 
that when those household characteristics appear on the left-hand side of the regression we use the raw 
data before completion.   12
our purpose. The reason for this is that, as mentioned before, only in general schools 
the maximum class size rule is relevant.
11  
We follow Angrist and Lavy (1999), a class size function induced by a maximum 
class  size  rule  is  used  to  construct  IV  estimates  of  class  size  effects  on  student 
outcomes  among  elementary  schools  in  Israel.  Assuming  that  schools  divide  their 
grade  enrollment  into  classes  of  equal  size  and  also  that  schools  open  additional 
classes only when triggered by the maximum class size rule, Angrist and Lavy (1999) 
obtained  a  non-monotonic  class  size  function  of  enrollment.  Since  class  size  is  a 
function of enrollment, and enrollment is likely to be correlated with factors that are 
related to student outcomes, they included smooth functions of enrollment - a second 
order polynomial function of enrollment, and a continuous piecewise linear trend - in 
their covariate set in order to extract out of the instrument any potential relationship 
between enrollment and student outcomes. The validity of their design relies on two 
assumptions, that the smooth functions of enrollment fully control for any relationship 
between class size and enrollment (in which case identification is achieved merely 
from the discontinuities that exist at the cut-off points); and that discontinuities do not 
exist at the cut-off points of the maximum class size rule in any of the variables that 
are related to student outcomes.   
There are strong reasons to believe that these assumptions are much less likely to 
hold in secondary than in elementary public schools. In elementary schools, pupils are 
younger, and are restricted to attend schools near their homes. Consequently, rules are 
much  stricter  regarding  exclusion  of  pupils  from  local  elementary  schools  which 
weakens their ability to control enrollment. In secondary schools, manipulation of the 
maximum class size rule is more likely to occur, also because the responsibility for 
                                                 
11 Hence, the results may not be generalizeable to comprehensive schools or technological schools.  
   13
students’ assignment rests with local authorities, not with the Ministry of Education.  
This  is  the  case  both  institutionally  and  theoretically,  as  argued  above;  now  we 




4.1. Instrument’s validity 
We, first, test whether when controlling for the smooth functions of enrollment the 
instrument is indeed not correlated with characteristics that are likely to affect student 
outcomes. To this end, we estimate each of our covariates on the expected class size 
(the instrument) and one of the smooth functions of enrollment (either the polynomial 
function or the continuous piecewise linear trend). Column 1 in Table 2 reports the 
estimated effect of the expected class size on each of our covariates when the smooth 
function included in the estimation is a piecewise linear trend and Column 2 for when 
the smooth function is a second order polynomial of enrollment. The results indicate 
that  both  smooth  functions  fail  to  extract  from  the  instrument  the  continuous 
relationship with enrollment. Column 1 shows that when controlling for the second-
order polynomial function of enrollment, the instrument is significantly correlated at 
the 5% level with father's years of schooling, mother's years of schooling, father's 
birthplace and school type. In addition, it is significantly correlated at the 10% level 
with  number  of  siblings  and  disadvantaged  index  of  the  school  in  2008-2009. 
Similarly, Column 2 shows that when controlling for a piecewise linear trend, the 
instrument  is  significantly  correlated  at  the  5%  level  with  dummies  for  father 
birthplace and school type, and at the 10% level with number of siblings. In this case, 
just  as  the  instrument  is  correlated  with  our  observed  covariates  it  may  be  also   14
correlated with unobserved covariates that affect student outcomes, thus invalidating 
the RD design. 
Next,  we  follow  Urquiola  and  Verhoogen  (2009)  and  implement  the  density 
discontinuity test suggested by McCrary (2008). It is noteworthy that unlike them, in 
our dataset we do not find any evidence for stacking at enrollments that are multiples 
of  the  maximum  class  size  rule.  The  histogram  of  12
th  grade  enrollments  among 
public schools in Israel presented in Figure 1 does not show any pattern in which the 
number of schools just at the cut-off points is much larger than the number of schools 
before or after the cut-offs. In addition, the figure indicates that we must concentrate 
our analysis on the two first cut-off points since there are not enough schools in the 
third, fourth or fifth cut-offs.  
Although we do not find evidence for stacking, we do find strong evidence for 
discontinuities at the cut-off points between enrollment and household characteristics. 
Figure 2 presents enrollment-cell means of mother's years of schooling, father's years 
of schooling and disadvantaged index of the school for the year 2008-2009, along 
with fitted values obtained from a weighted kernel regression within each enrollment 
segment. This figure shows that students after the cut-off points come from families 
with  less  educated  parents  and  schools  with  a  higher  disadvantaged  index  (lower 
socioeconomic  status).  This  evidence  indicates  a  pattern  in  which  predetermined 
covariates change discontinuously around the cut-off points, and that students after 
the cut-off points come from weaker backgrounds.   
Like Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) we also report regression results for each of 
the  mentioned  household  characteristics  on  dummies  on  whether  enrollments  are 
above each of the cut-off points and on piecewise linear splines for enrollment (see 
Table 3). The results for mother's years of schooling and father's years of schooling   15
indicate  that  the  jumps  at  all  three  first  enrollment  cut-offs  are  substantial  and 
significant.  In  addition,  the  jump  at  the  first  cutoff  point  is  significant  for  the 
disadvantaged  index  of  the  school.  Taken  together,  these  results  strongly  confirm 
Figure 2 that the continuity assumptions are violated.    
Finally,  we  focus  more  narrowly  around  the  discontinuities,  following  a  local 
linear specification, as used in McCrary, 2008, and others, which allows for linear 
trends to the left and to the right of the cutoff point. For example, to test whether a 
discontinuity  exists  at  the  first  cutoff  point  between  enrollment  and  mother's 
education we estimate the following specification   
 
MEics = b0 + b1 * ERCs + b2 * (ERCs*ACs) + b3*ACs + Uics   , 
 
where  ME  is  mother  education,  ERC  (enrollment  relative  to  the  cutoff)  is  actual 
enrollment  minus  38,  and  AC  (after  the  cutoff)  equals  one  if  ERC>0  and  zero 
otherwise.  In this specification, b1 captures the slope of the line to the left of the 
potential  discontinuity,  b2  captures  the  slope  to  the  right,  and  b3  estimates  the 
discontinuity. Table 4 reports the results. It indicates that discontinuities exist at the 
first cutoff point between enrollment and all households' characteristics, while at the 
second cutoff point they exist only between enrollment and mother's education.   
 
4.2 How large is the IV bias?  
Before discussing how large the bias of the  IV estimates is likely to be, we first 
present OLS and IV estimates of the class size effect on eligibility for matriculation 
diploma. Table 5 presents naive estimates of the effect of class size on eligibility for a   16
matriculation diploma both with and without control variables.
12 The results indicate 
that class size  always has a strong significant  positive effect on student outcome. 
However, this effect is smaller when we control for our set of covariates (Columns 3 
and 4).   
Table 6 reports IV estimates of a specification that controls for a piecewise linear 
trend. The standard errors are clustered by enrollment levels, as is appropriate when 
the assignment variable is discrete (Lee and Card, 2008).
13 The first stage estimations 
indicate that the instrument has a significant positive effect on actual class size, and 
the f-statistic on the excluded instruments pass the minimal critical value required by 
Stock and Yogo (2005) in order for the instrument not to be considered weak. IV 
estimates  without  controls  indicate  that  class  size  has  a  positive  effect  though 
insignificant on eligibility for a matriculation diploma. When control variables are 
included in the estimation the estimated class size effect falls from 0.02 to 0.005. 
Although both effects are insignificant they differ substantially in size.   
Table 7 presents IV estimates when we control for a second-order polynomial 
function of enrollment. The results again indicate that the instrument is not weak and 
the estimated class size effects on outcome are quite similar to those obtained with the 
piecewise linear trend. As previously, the effect of class size on the eligibility for a 
                                                 
12 We are aware that our outcome measure, eligibility for a matriculation diploma, ignores quality. It 
also suffers from the fact that while we estimate the effect of the homeclass size on eligibility for a 
matriculation diploma, about half of the subjects on which the students are tested in the matriculation 
exams are not studied in the homeclass.  To address this latter issue we also estimated class size effects 
on test scores in specific subjects that are studied in the homeclass and found them to be insignificant 
(the results of these estimations are available from the authors upon request).  
13  As  enrollment  categories  are  supersets  of  schools  (i.e.,  multiple  schools  may  have  the  same 
enrollment but multiple enrollments in the same school is not feasible), clustering on enrollment is 
considered  a  more  conservative  strategy  than  clustering  at  school  level.  We  choose  to  follow  a 
conservative line and to cluster the standard errors by enrollment. In addition, to show that our results 
are not sensitive to the type of clustering we reran all the estimations with school clusters as well and 
found that all the findings were qualitatively very similar. These results are available from the authors 
upon request.      17
matriculation diploma is quite sensitive to the inclusion of control covariates in the 
estimation.   
Next, we use the methodology of Altonji et al. (2005) to assess the size of the IV 
bias induced by the discontinuities between enrollment and household characteristics. 
The calculation of the bias is based on the assumption that the amount of selection on 
unobservables exactly equals the amount of selection on observables. Alternatively, 
we  also  calculate  the  bias  under  the  assumption  that  the  amount  of  selection  on 
unobservables equals a specific proportion of the amount of selection on observables. 
In our study the bias is calculated somewhat differently from that in Altonji et al. 
(2005)  because  of  two  reasons.  First,  the  smooth  functions  of  enrollment  are  not 
treated as regular observables but rather as part of the identification strategy. Thus, the 
correlations between the Maimonides' rule and the smooth functions of enrollment do 
not affect the calculated size of the bias. That is, we assume that a bias is likely to 
exist only if controlling for the smooth functions of enrollment, the instrument is still 
correlated with our other observables. Second, the bias formula in Altonji et al. (2005) 
is written for the case in which the instrument is an indicator variable while in our 
case the instrument is a scalar. Because of these two differences we try to be formal in 
describing how we calculate the bias.
14  
Let the outcome  i Y  (eligibility for matriculation diploma) be determined by  
 
(1)            ics ics s s cs ics X EN EN CS Y ε γ δ δ α + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = '
2
1 0        
 
                                                 
14  We are grateful to Todd Elder for providing us with the Stata program that calculates the bias in 
addition to his many comments and suggestions.    18
where CS is class size, EN is enrollment, X is a set of exogenous control covariates  
and γ  is determined such that  ( ) 0 , cov = ics ics X ε . Obviously, class size is endogenous 
and thus correlates with  ics ε . Let class size be determined by  
 
        (2)         ics s ics cs u EN EN MR X CS + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =
2
2 1 ' η η λ β  
 
where the Maimonides' rule (our instrument) is assumed to not directly influence the 
eligibility for a matriculation diploma but to possibly be correlated with  ics ε . Finally, 
we define  ics v  as the residuals from an OLS estimation of  s MR  on  ics X . It is well 
known that the asymptotic bias in an IV estimate of α  equals
15  
 
      (3)        IV Bias =  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ics ics cs ics ics ics v Var MR Cov v Var v Cov ⋅ = ⋅ λ ε λ ε / , / ,  
 
Assuming that the amount of selection on unobservables equals a proportion p of the 
amount of selection on observables we obtain that  
 


















⋅ =  
 
Substituting (4) into (3) we obtain the IV bias as a function of  p  
 
    (5)  IV Bias =  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [ ] ics ics
ics ics s
v Var X Var











                                                 
15  See Altonji et al. (2005, page 805).   19
It is then straight forward that the correct class size effect is the IV estimated effect 
minus  the  IV  bias.  The  corrected  class  size  effects  for  different  values  of  p  are 
reported in Table 8, where column 1 reports the corrected class size effects for when 
the  smooth  function  included  in  the  estimation  is  the  second  order  polynomial 
function of enrollment, and Column 2 reports for when the smooth function is the 
piecewise  linear  trend.  Column  1  shows  that  even  for  an  amount  of  selection  on 
unobservables that is 1/10
th as strong as the amount of selection on observables, the 
entire positive effect would be eliminated. Similarly, if the amount of selection on 
observables is 50% as strong as selection on observables, class size has a substantial 
negative effect on the eligibility for a matriculation diploma. Specifically, reducing 
class size by ten pupils increases the probability of achieving a matriculation diploma 
by 15 percentage points. The results in Column 2 are even more sensitive to p. If 
selection on unobservables is only 20% as strong as selection on observables then 
class  size  has  a  quite  substantial  negative  effect  on  eligibility  for  matriculation 
diploma. Taken together, it seems that the bias induced by the discontinuities between 
enrollment and household characteristics is not likely to be negligible.   
 
4.3. Elementary schools 
To illustrate the importance of institutional details for the validity of the RD design, 
we now apply the above analysis on Israeli elementary public schools first studied in 
Angrist and Lavy’s (1999).  To this end we employ four variables used there, percent 
disadvantaged, grade enrollment, piecewise linear trend, and the Maimonides' rule (I 
should mention that these are all the variables that they used).
16  To begin, we confirm 
that  among  Israeli  elementary  public  schools  (where,  as  mentioned  earlier,  rules 
                                                 
16  A  full  description  of  the  dataset  in  available  at:  http://econ-
www.mit.edu/faculty/angrist/data/anglavy99.   20
regarding exclusions of pupils from local schools are relatively stricter) manipulation 
of the treatment assignment rule is not likely to occur. One issue is whether, when 
controlling for the smooth functions of enrollment, the expected class size according 
to  the  Maimonides'  rule  (our  instrument)  is  indeed  not  correlated  with  percent 
disadvantaged.  We estimate percent disadvantaged on the expected class size and a 
smooth function of enrollment. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 9 report the estimated effect 
when the smooth function included in the estimation is a piecewise linear trend and 
when the smooth function is a second order polynomial of enrollment, respectively. 
The  results  indicate  that,  indeed,  the  instrument  is  not  correlated  with  percent 
disadvantaged. Next, we perform a similar test but use the specification of Urquiola 
and Verhoogen (2009) and estimate percent disadvantaged on dummies for whether 
enrollments are above each of the cut-off points as well as on piecewise linear splines 
for enrollment (see Table 10). The results, again, indicate that the jumps at all five 
enrollment cut-offs are insignificant.  
In addition, we also report regressions of percent disadvantaged only for narrow 
intervals around the first three cut-offs.  As for secondary schooling, we follow a local 
linear specification which allows for linear trends to the left and to the right of the 
cutoff point. Table 11 reports the results. It shows that there is no discontinuity in the 
relationship between enrollment and percent disadvantaged. To sum up, our analysis 
suggests that the RD design among Israeli elementary public schools is valid, offering 




   21
5. Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  guided  by  a  mechanism  that  can  explain  the  discontinuities  in  the 
relationship  between  household  characteristics  and  enrollment,  we  demonstrate 
existence of such discontinuities in the context of secondary public schools in Israel.  
Specifically,  household  characteristics  jump  around  cut-off  points  induced  by  a 
maximum class size rule, where students after the cut-off points consistently come 
from weaker backgrounds. This is consistent with the cross national evidence in West 
and  Woessmann  (2006)  that  public  school  systems  typically  exhibit  strong 
compensatory patterns of student sorting.  This, in turn, invalidates the RD design and 
may cause researchers to mistakenly conclude that class size has no causal effect on 
student outcomes even if it actually has a negative effect.  Furthermore, we show that 
the IV bias induced by the discontinuities may be quite substantial. Yet, we found that 
these  results  do  not  apply  to  elementary  schools.    Our  findings  extend  those  of 
Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) who detect discontinuities in Chilean private schools.  
We further show that discontinuities may exist even when there is no evidence for 
stacking of schools at enrollments that are multiples of the class size cap, indicating 
that even under this condition the RD design may not be valid.  Our main general 
conclusion is that the ultimate success of the RD design hinges upon the institutional 
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 Figure 1. 12
th grade enrollments among public schools in Israel, 2003 
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Figure 2.  Student characteristics and enrollment in secondary public schools, 2003 
Panel A: Father's schooling 
Panel B: Mother's schooling 
 
Panel C: Disadvantaged index 2008-2009   27
  




Deviation  Mean  Variable 
12242  0.463  0.690  Eligibility 
12242  0.500  0.521  Gender (1=female) 
10199  3.380  13.703  Father's years of schooling  
10059  3.060  13.677  Mother's years of schooling  
12097  1.459  1.281  Number of siblings 
5650  2.792  3.966  Disadvantaged index 2003 
11792  2.017  3.710  Disadvantaged index 2008-2009 
11002  0.603  0.524  Socioeconomic index 
12228  8.254  30.178  Actual class size 
12228  95.927  144.910  Enrollment 
12228  5.728  31.790  Expected average class size 
12204  0.294  0.523  Proportion of females in the class 
12242  0.369  0.163  New Immigrant (1=Yes) 
12116  0.461  0.307  School type (1 = Religious) 
10702  0.418  0.225  Father's birthplace: America-Europe (1=Yes) 
10702  0.393  0.191  Father's birthplace: Asia-Africa (1=Yes) 
10702  0.039  0.001  Father's birthplace: Other location (1=Yes) 
11107  0.426  0.238  Mother's birthplace: America-Europe (1=Yes) 
11107  0.356  0.149  Mother's birthplace: Asia-Africa (1=Yes) 
11107  0.033  0.001  Mother's birthplace: Other location (1=Yes) 




*** Significant at the 1% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
Notes:  Standard errors clustered at the enrollment level are in parentheses. 
 
Table 2.  Univariate regressions of each of our covariates on the  Maimonides' rule and 
the smooth functions of enrollment 




linear trend   
Second order 
polynomial function of 
enrollment 
Specification 











Father's years of schooling 
10,052  0.059 
(0.047) 
   0.081
** 
(0.040) 
Mother's years of schooling 







Number of siblings 




Disadvantaged index 2003 





Disadvantaged index 2008-2009 









Proportion of females in the class  




New immigrant (1=Yes)  




Father's birthplace: America-Europe (1=Yes) 







Father's birthplace: Asia-Africa (1=Yes) 






  Father's birthplace: Other location (1=Yes) 




Mother's birthplace: America-Europe (1=Yes) 




Mother's birthplace: Asia-Africa (1=Yes) 




Mother's birthplace: Other location (1=Yes) 
12,102     0.019
** 
(0.007) 
   0.018
** 
(0.007)
  School type (1 = Religious)   29
 
  
*** Significant at the 1% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
Notes:  Standard errors clustered at the enrollment level are in parentheses. 
 
Table 3. Behavior of selected variables at the cut-off points 




Mother's years of 
schooling 
Father's years of 
schooling  Dependent variable   








     11.255
*** 
(0.628)









     -2.481
*** 










  1{enroll≥77} 
0.851 
(1.352) 




   -2.627
** 
(1.036)






(3.309)  1{enroll≥153} 







(1.249)  1{enroll≥191} 















  1{enroll≥267} 








     0.085
*** 
(0.025)


























(0.098)  (enroll-153)*1{enroll≥153} 





















(0.037)  (enroll-267)*1{enroll≥267} 
94  95  96  Number of clusters 
11,778  10,052  10,196  Number of observations   30
 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
Notes:  Standard errors clustered at the enrollment level are in parentheses. 
 
  





Mother's years  
of schooling 
Dependent Variable: 
Father's years  
of schooling 
Explanatory 





   0.768
** 
(0.238)
  (enroll-38) 
≤enroll≤43 34    


















    -4.068
*** 



























  1{enroll≥77} 




       31
  
  
Table 5. Naive estimations 
With controls  Without controls   
Probit  OLS  Probit  OLS   













    0.321
*** 
(0.098)
  Constant 












   0.013
*** 
(0.003)
  Class size 
94  94  94  94  Number of clusters 
11,754  11,754  11,754  11,754  Number of observations 
  
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy indicating eligibility for a matriculation diploma.  Individual controls 
include: gender, parents' average years of schooling, number of siblings, ethnicity, a dummy variable indicating 
immigrant status, dummies indicating the mother's and father's continent of birth, and indicators for missing values 
of number of siblings, parents' average years of schooling, mother's continent of birth and father's continent of 
birth. Class and school controls include: percent females in the class and disadvantaged index of the school for the 
year 2008-2009. Standard errors clustered at the enrollment level are in parentheses. 
 





*** Significant at the 1% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy indicating eligibility for a matriculation diploma.  Individual controls 
include: gender, parents' average years of schooling, number of siblings, ethnicity, a dummy variable indicating 
immigrant status, dummies indicating the mother's and father's continent of birth, and indicators for missing 
values  of  number  of  siblings,  parents'  average  years  of  schooling,  mother's  continent  of  birth  and  father's 
continent of birth. Class and school controls include: percent females in the class and disadvantaged index of 
the school for the year 2008-2009. Standard errors clustered at the enrollment level are in parentheses. 
 
Table 6. IV estimates controlling for a piecewise linear trend 
With controls   Without controls     
(6)   (5)   (4)   (3)   (2)   (1)   
2SLS   Reduced 
form    First stage   2SLS   Reduced 
form    First stage    
















  Constant 
  0.002 
(0.004) 
   0.309
** 
(0.121)    0.007 
(0.005) 
    0.326
*** 
     (0.125)
  Expected average class size 
0.005 
(0.013)      0.0214 
(0.017)      Class size 
    0.005
*** 
(0.002) 
    0.005
*** 
(0.001) 





    0.004
*** 
(0.001) 
    0.100
*** 
(0.026)  Piecewise linear trend 
    6.57      6.85  Stock-Yogo test (2005)  
  (F-Statistic)   
    5.53-16.38      5.53-16.38  Range of critical values for   
Stock-Yogo test (2005) 
94  94  94  94  94  94  Number of clusters 





*** Significant at the 1% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
*  Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy indicating eligibility for a matriculation diploma.  Individual controls 
include: gender, parents' average years of schooling, number of siblings, ethnicity, a dummy variable indicating 
immigrant status, dummies indicating the mother's and father's continent of birth, and indicators for missing 
values  of  number  of  siblings,  parents'  average  years  of  schooling,  mother's  continent  of  birth  and  father's 
continent of birth. Class and school controls include: percent females in the class and disadvantaged index of 
the school for the year 2008-2009. Standard errors clustered at the enrollment level are in parentheses. 
 
Table 7. IV estimates controlling for a second order polynomial function of enrollment  
With controls   Without controls     
(6)    (5)   (4)    (3)   (2)    (1)   
2SLS   Reduced 
form    First stage   2SLS    Reduced 
form    First stage    




















   0.320
*** 




  (0.126)  Expected average class size 
0.003 
(0.012)     
0.021 
(0.016)      Class size 
   0.004
*** 
(0.001) 








   0.003
*** 
(0.001) 
    0.073
*** 
(0.026)  Enrollment 
   -0.007
** 
(0.003) 







   -0.005
*** 
(0.002) 
   -0.152
** 
(0.074)  Enrollment squared 
    6.88      7.24  Stock-Yogo test (2005) - 
  F-Statistic 
    5.53-16.38      5.53-16.38  Range of critical values for   
Stock-Yogo test (2005) 
94  94  94  94  94  94  Number of clusters 






Table 8. Corrected class size effects for different values of  p 
Specification   
(2)  (1)   
Piecewise linear trend  Second order polynomial 
function of enrollment  p 
0.005  0.003  0 
-0.003  0  0.1 
-0.011  -0.004  0.2 
-0.018  -0.008  0.3 
-0.026  -0.011  0.4 
-0.034  -0.015  0.5 
-0.042  -0.019  0.6 
-0.050  -0.023  0.7 
-0.057  -0.026  0.8 
-0.065  -0.030  0.9 
-0.073  -0.034  1 
         35
 
  
Table 9. Regressions of percent disadvantaged on the  Maimonides' rule and the 
smooth functions of enrollment 
(2)  (1)  
Percent disadvantaged  Percent disadvantaged    Dependent variable  












Expected average class size 
(Maimonides'  rule) 
   -0.271
*** 
(0.029)
     Enrollment 
    0.080
*** 
(0.013)
     Enrollment squared/100  
     -0.308
*** 
(0.026)
   Piecewise linear trend 
151  143  Number of clusters 
2,059  2,009  Number of observations 
 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 




*** Significant at the 1% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
Notes:  Standard errors clustered at the enrollment level are in parentheses. 
Table 10. Behavior of percent disadvantaged at the cut-off points 
OLS    
Percent disadvantaged  Dependent variable   
    21.190
*** 
(3.619)
  Constant 
-1.617 
(2.220)  1{enroll≥41} 
-1.557 
(1.331)  1{enroll≥81} 
-1.797 
(1.764)  1{enroll≥121} 
1.083 
(4.482)  1{enroll≥161} 
-6.425 
(7.045)  1{enroll≥201} 
0.008 
(0.125)  enrollment  
-0.202 
(0.133)  (enroll-41)*1{enroll≥41} 
   0.155
** 
(0.063)
   (enroll-81)*1{enroll≥81} 
0.045 
(0.079)  (enroll-121)*1{enroll≥121} 
0.071 
(0.222)  (enroll-161)*1{enroll≥161} 
0.041 
(0.305)  (enroll-201)*1{enroll≥201} 
151  Number of clusters 
2,059  Number of observations     37
 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
Notes:  Standard errors clustered at the enrollment level are in parentheses.  
Table 11.  Discontinuities in percent disadvantaged at each cut-off point   
  Explanatory Variables  Sample 
    -2.096
*** 
(0.313)
  (enroll-40) 
≤enroll≤45 36    
2.454 
(1.425)  (enroll-40)∗1{enroll≥41} 
-3.119 
(2.835)  1{enroll≥41} 
0.177 
(0.489)  (enroll-80) 
76≤enroll≤85 
-1.156 
(1.032)  (enroll-80)∗1{enroll≥81} 
1.907 
(3.928)  1{enroll≥81} 
1.092 
(0.770)  (enroll-120) 
≤enroll≤125 116     -1.759 
(1.746)  (enroll-120)∗1{enroll≥121} 
-5.013 
(6.145)  1{enroll≥121} 
     